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On Winning the 40-Hour Week
Rowan Cahill
The 40-hour week was approved by the Commonwealth 
Arbitration Court on 8 September 1947, to take effect from 1 
January 1948. The 40-hour campaign, the 35-hour campaign 
that followed in the late 1950s, the 44-hour campaign that 
preceded these, and union attempts between all three to 
fix the working week at either 30 or 33 hours, were parts 
of a long movement for the codification and reduction of 
Australian working hours that began in the mid 1850s with 
struggles by workers to establish the principle of the 8-hour 
day. Stonemasons in Sydney and Melbourne gained the first 
successes during 1855 and 1856. At the time skilled workers in 
these cities generally worked 10 hours per day Monday to Friday 
with 8 hours on Saturday. For other workers it was longer; shop 
assistants, for example, worked 12–14 hours per day. During the 
period 1913-1963, which embraces much of this campaigning, 
hours, leave and wages were the greatest causes of time lost 
in Australian industrial disputes, while rating second to issues 
relating to physical working conditions and managerial policy 
as causes of industrial conflict. 
Historically the codification and reduction of Australian 
working hours was not a linear progression from Point A to 
Point B. Rather there were twists, turns, reversals. At times the 
working hours issue had worker and trade union priority, at 
times it played second fiddle to other working conditions; it was 
variously put on hold by history (for example during World War 
2), and at times took steps backward. For example in 1920-21 
timber workers and some engineers were awarded the 44-hour 
week by the Commonwealth Arbitration Court, only to have it 
taken away in 1922. Further it was a progression that did not 
necessarily benefit all workers equally at the same time. Some 
workers were able to gain reduced working hours when others 
could not; for example in 1922 shearers in NSW, Victoria and 
South Australia gained the 44-hour week when shed hands did 
not and had to work a 52-hour week. This sort of disparity had 
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much to do with factors like the skills of the workers involved, 
their availability on the labour market, their strategic place 
within an industry or a State/National economy, the strength 
of their industrial organisation, the quality of their leadership, 
and how employers variously and differently assessed the issue 
of shorter hours with regard to productivity and profitability. 
The reduction of Australian working hours began as a 
‘quality of life’ issue and was seeded by the 8-8-8 campaigns 
of the nineteenth century, encapsulated in the slogan “Eight 
hours work, Eight hours recreation, Eight hours rest”. The roots 
of this in turn were in the political radicalism which, during the 
first half of the nineteenth century, brought England to a state 
of revolutionary crisis, a rich cauldron where Chartist, trade 
union, liberal, democratic, republican, co-operative, socialist, 
religious, moral, ideas and impulses variously clashed, mixed, 
intertwined, and working people mobilized to bring about social, 
economic, and political change. 
Powerful in this brew were the ideas, alternatives, 
initiatives of the Welsh social reformer, factory owner, pioneer 
socialist Robert Owen (1771–1858), and the ideas and work 
of his supporters (Owenism, Owenites).2 During the first two 
decades of the nineteenth century, Owen pioneered reduced 
working hours in his cotton-mills in opposition to the tyranny 
and debilitating work regimes of the industrial revolution, with a 
view to promoting ‘character-formation’—the physical, mental, 
educational and moral wellbeing of his workers. Later, during 
the 1830s, Owen was prominent in agitation for the eight-
hours day, and mass strike action to achieve it. This advocacy 
coincided with the heyday of the Chartist movement; many 
Chartists had been associated with Owenism, and Owenites 
went into the Chartist movement as ‘social missionaries’.3 
Chartists eventually found their way to Australia; just 
over 100 were transported as convicts; many more came as 
free settlers, individually or collectively, especially following the 
collapse of Chartism after 1850, and were amongst those who 
pioneered and led the early antipodean 8-8-8 movement.4 Early 
critics of 8-8-8 argued that workers, freed from the social and 
moral disciplines of work, would turn their hands to frivolous 
pursuits, alcohol in particular. To which 8-8-8 supporters 
countered, no, they might actually seek to improve the quality 
of their lives, with education cited as a priority.5 Apart from 
the devil waiting in the wings for idle hands, 8-8-8 threatened 
employer profits, and pointed to future social and political 
change and unrest.
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For a complexity of reasons, pursuit of a shorter working 
week became an Australian trade union priority. In buoyant 
economic times it was seen as a means of spreading available 
work equally amongst those already employed, while in slack 
economic times as a means of helping ease unemployment; 
it was also a way of securing for workers an unofficial and 
lasting pay rise by way of overtime, one that could not simply 
be negated by increasing prices; strategically it was a means 
of linking payment for work done to hours worked as opposed 
to constant employer attempts to pay according to incentive 
schemes. By 1927 piecework was common in Australian 
industry; a decade later it seems 20 per cent of jobs were paid 
by piecework. Favoured by powerful and influential employers, 
incentive schemes were largely anathema to the trade union 
movement, associated with the worst of working conditions in 
the Old World of Britain, associated with sweated labour, and 
regarded as an attempt to remove unions from the bargaining 
process; piecework had helped generate the traumatic 1917 
‘General Strike’ in New South Wales.6
During all the ‘hours’ campaigns, including the 40-hour 
week campaign, trade union representatives and advocates 
argued that increased leisure time was paramount to an increased 
standard of living for workers. In reality reduced working-week 
campaigns did not necessarily deliver the moral/spiritual/self-
improvement recreational time originally envisaged by Owen. 
Instead workers were delivered access to overtime, the ability 
to take up a second job, increased disposable incomes, and 
entrée to the individualistic world of consumerism. The success 
of the various ‘hours’ campaigns had a great deal to do with the 
Australian system of social democracy in place for much of the 
twentieth century. High tariffs protected industry and jobs from 
foreign competition; (White Australia) immigration controls 
further protected jobs, and there were minimum wage laws. A 
key agency helping deliver improved working conditions for all 
workers was the complex system of Industrial Relations which 
operated, into which conflict and adversarialism were built. 
It involved State and Commonwealth laws and authorities, 
specialist bodies like the Joint Coal Board, and mechanisms for 
private mediation and negotiation. Skilled trade union tacticians 
and IR specialists learned how to work and use the system to 
advance industrial and political agendas. For governments 
this social democratic totality required residual state welfare, 
and, during much of the twentieth century when there was an 
international alternative to capitalism in the form of bolshevism 
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and its heirs, generally functioned to dampen and/or contain 
militancy that might otherwise have threatened the capitalist 
state.
Following World War I there were demands and strikes 
in pursuit of the 44-hour working week. In places where some 
workers already had achieved this, as in the building industry in 
Adelaide and Brisbane, there were demands and stoppages for 
the 40-hour working week. Victorian metal unions campaigned 
for the 40-hour week in 1919 and 1920. The 1930 Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) Conference demanded the 
40-hour week.7 But the real kick-start was in 1935 when 
the Australian government’s representative at the Geneva 
Convention of the International Labor Office, Sir Frederick 
Stewart, voted in favour of the 40-hour week. As well as being a 
conservative politician, Stewart was a prominent businessman, 
philanthropist, political gadfly, Methodist, social reformer, more 
“active in social and industrial policy than virtually all Labor 
politicians of his generation”. While the conservative Lyons 
government refused to ratify the convention, Stewart became an 
advocate for the 40-hour week upon his return to Australia and 
implemented it in his own considerable business enterprises.8
The ACTU began campaigning in earnest for the 40-hour 
week in 1936, and at its 1937 Congress declared the 40-hour 
week to be not only possible, but necessary and imperative. 
Its argument was that mechanisation had and was increasing 
worker productivity, and workers had the right to share in 
growing profits. Moreover, workers were entitled “to the fullest 
amount of leisure, so as to cultivate the art of intelligent living”. 
As the ACTU perceived industrial reality, current arbitration 
authorities opposed anything shorter than the 44-hour week, 
so it resolved to support direct action by any union/s in pursuit 
of the 40-hour objective.9 Which it did; after the communist led 
Miners Federation gained the 40-hour week in 1938, the ACTU 
backed strike action in 1940 to extend this to surface workers in 
the mining industry, only for the campaign to collapse following 
government threats to introduce non-union labour onto the 
minefields, and with little campaign support forthcoming from 
other unions.
It is a misnomer to think that Australia entered World 
War II with the full support of its citizenry; a month after the 
outbreak of war, Australian pro-war support waned.10 The 
nation literally had to be convinced, corralled into supporting 
the war effort. Factors which helped reverse this waning include 
government propaganda and censorship efforts, the advent 
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to power of the Curtin Labor government (1941), the reversal 
by the Australian Communist Party of its opposition to the 
war following Germany’s attack on Russia (1941), the fear of 
invasion by Japan exacerbated by Japanese attacks from air 
and sea on mainland Australia (1942ff), ongoing government 
coercive threats and procedures against recalcitrant workers, 
consultation with and involvement of the trade union movement 
in manpower decisions and processes, trade union leaderships’ 
disciplining of their rank and files. At the grass roots level, 
however, disruptive industrial activity continued throughout 
the war, and man-days lost in industry as a whole between 
1942-1945 exceeded anything chalked up since 1929.11 
But overall the mood was of putting trade union claims 
on hold; the war was an interruption to normalcy; the struggle 
would be continued once international peace had been restored. 
And so mostly things were accepted, agreed to, including 
pegged wages, longer working hours, that would otherwise 
have been opposed. Moreover the war demonstrated that an 
economy could be planned, resources could be mobilized, full 
employment could be achieved. It all pointed in the direction of 
a better world, and an expectation that wartime sacrifices would 
be rewarded post-peace; the 40-hour week was widely regarded 
by workers as a due entitlement.12 In early 1944 the Federal 
ALP Conference backed a Post-War Committee 40-hour week 
recommendation, and the ACTU began planning and negotiating 
the week with government ministers. Future wartime Prime 
Minister John Curtin (ALP) had promised the 40-hour week in 
1937, as an election promise, and had reckoned an Australian 
government could legislate it into effect without it having to go 
to arbitration.13 
In 1945 the ACTU put the 40-hour week back on the 
national agenda, arguing as Curtin had done, the government 
could legislate the 40-hour week, rather than unions having 
to work the matter through the arbitration system. Curtin was 
dead, and the Labor government refused, fearing the move 
would lead to inflation and depression, and left the decision 
for the Arbitration Court. Increasingly Labor was sensitive to 
mounting post-war critiques by conservatives and employers 
who had found renewed organisational strength through 
the war, of ‘creeping socialism’, and sought to insulate itself 
from potential electoral fallout by handing the decision to an 
‘independent’ arbiter. However it did intervene to help get the 
case before the Court .14
The case began in May 1946 and ran to September 
Illawarra Unity
21
1947, a sixteen-month period involving 126 days of hearings, 
26 advocates, 228 witnesses, and 440 exhibits. The bench was 
overworked and understrength as it juggled two major cases 
simultaneously, the hours case and a review of the Basic Wage. 
Employers played tactics, trying to link the two cases with a 
view to sabotaging the hours case. The ACTU threatened its first 
national strike. It was a frustrating process that generated a great 
deal of hostility/animosity in the trade union movement.15 
From 1935 onwards the Amalgamated Engineering Union 
(AEU) was the “prime agitator” for the 40-hour week; the issue 
was a major objective for the union and discussion of it “was 
seldom absent from the pages of its journal”.16 The AEU was 
Australia’s largest manufacturing union with a preference for 
industrial rather than political action. The union had set up 
shop in Sydney in 1852, its roots in the bitter formative struggles 
of nineteenth century British trade unionism, where the length 
of the working day was a prominent issue. As the union grew 
in Australia it developed deep rooted hostility towards moves to 
have work paid under incentive schemes, rather than by hours 
worked. During the late nineteenth century, the principle of 
incentive schemes had been forced upon British engineering 
workers. In 1924 a rule prohibiting piecework was inserted in 
the AEU Rule Book.17 
During the time the hours issue was before the Court, the 
AEU engaged in a long running and bitter strike over the issue 
of increased margins for its members. The dispute was national, 
crucially involved power and transport systems, and ended up 
in a win for the union. It drastically eroded the union’s financial 
resources, and was judged (in 1975) “one of the most hard-
fought and certainly the most costly strike for a single union in 
the nation’s industrial history”.18 While this 1946-47 strike was 
not related industrially to the hours issue, it was politically. 
The AEU was prominently identified with the hours campaign, 
and its margins campaign demonstrated the sort of industrial 
resolve present in the Australian workforce and the extent 
of dissatisfaction with the way post-war working conditions 
generally were panning out. It was a time of high trade union 
membership with 50.8% of employees unionised. The message 
would not have been lost on the government, nor on arbitration 
authorities. Significantly, when the ACTU threatened a national 
strike in 1946 over the progress of the hours case, the Labor 
government leaned “on the Court to have it revise procedures 
which would have prejudiced the unions’ case”.19 
The Communist Party of Australia (CPA) had a key role in 
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winning the 40-hour week. During the period from 1935 to the 
end of the 1940s, the CPA exerted significant influence within 
the trade union movement; the militancy of unionists during 
the 40-hour campaign can to some extent be attributed to this. 
Apart from the industrial and political influence it had via its 
membership amongst trade union rank and file and at leadership 
levels, the party vigorously campaigned for the 40-hour week, 
variously working to influence both the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP) and the ACTU.20 
Ruminations
Notionally the 40-hour week was the objective of labour 
movements throughout much of the world from 1935 onwards. 
In Australia it was achieved by campaigning which ran the best 
part of twelve years. It was put on hold during World War II, 
and Australian workers and their unions expected the shorter 
working week as part of post-war working conditions, an 
expectation which carried the demand insistently forward. The 
campaign was not a simple process, and eventually involved 
the whole labour movement and the full range of tactics at 
its command, everything from pamphleteering, lobbying, 
networking, through to militancy. Eventually the issue ended 
up in the arbitration system, which in turn had to be prodded to 
an acceptable outcome by political pressures and militancy.
The world that yielded the 40-hour week has gone. The 
economy has changed, old industries have been eclipsed or 
disappeared, new ones have developed; the system that protected 
Australian jobs at the time, and the IR system that prevailed, 
have all gone; trade union membership has plummeted; the ALP 
has changed; organised communism is but a shadow of what it 
was; a culture permeates society, unfortunately infecting some 
within the ALP, that collective bargaining and unionism are IR/
economic dinosaurs; nationally there is extensive legislation 
which drastically curtails the operation of trade unions. Work 
too has changed, and the idea of a working week measured in 
a linear way in terms of hours and days has been white-anted 
by workforce casualisation, and by communications/cyber 
technology (emails, mobile phones, laptops, etc.) which makes 
many people ‘employees’ during/in what are, theoretically, their 
leisure times and private spaces. Further, due to globalisation 
and phenomena like ‘guest worker’ schemes and the offshoring 
of jobs, Australian workers are increasingly in labour market 
competition with workers overseas and their wages and 
conditions. So what do I, as a person committed to change from 
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below, take from all this?
An idea sown in society, as the 8-8-8 idea was back in the 1. 
1850s, does not necessarily have an immediate impact, 
but can, if tenaciously campaigned for, produce results 
way down the track—even a century later. Specifically, 
the achievement of the 40-hour week took at least 12 
years, 28 years if you include advocates for the shorter 
week post-World War 1. Campaigners from below should 
be prepared to develop a long view of history. 
The trade union membership levels that helped deliver 2. 
the 40-hour week are nothing like the reduced levels of 
union membership today, and might never be so again, 
given the strong cultural forces favouring consumerism, 
materialism and individualism, workforce casualisation, 
the entry of people into the workforce who have little or 
no trade union backgrounds, and an IR regime inimical 
to unionism. Which is not to say that unionism is washed 
up, or that militancy is a dead issue. Far from it. But 
barring a stroke of the pen which introduces compulsory 
unionism, or another stroke that wipes out or rolls 
back the no-name brand once known as WorkChoices, 
strokes of the pen Peter Pan might believe in, unions 
may have to see themselves less as mass organisations 
than as smaller, leaner, even residual, outfits. All this 
is a different ballgame, one in which there is much to 
learn from NGOs regarding policy theory and practice. 
In general, also, there is a need to build constituencies 
beyond union memberships and engage in issues that 
transcend traditional bread and butter union issues. And 
here the realm of social-movement unionism beckons.21 
Unions today need to see themselves as part, not only of 3. 
a national working class, but an international working 
class. Increasingly Australian workers are linked like 
shadows to their counterparts overseas, shadows that 
might even be beaten children in Asian sweatshops. 
Seems to me that while there is a need to think and act 
nationally, unions need to do the same internationally. It 
is incumbent upon unions to develop wherever possible 
the ways and means to act globally, anything from as 
simple as supporting petitions for trade unionists abroad 
on the receiving end of authoritarian anti-unionism, to 
providing funds or assistance to targeted projects abroad, 
to developing links with unions, forums, and peak 
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organisations abroad, to solidarity action/s if possible. 
It is not only a moral responsibility but a political one. 
Capital is global. An Australian union at some future 
time might, in turn, well benefit from solidarity actions 
and support from abroad. 
The past is history. It is there to contemplate, to be 4. 
inspired by, and creatively drawn from. History helps us 
understand who we are, and how we came to be where we 
are. Seldom is it an instruction manual. But in looking 
at history from below, that is from the vantage point of 
those who have no state given powers, no great wealth, no 
power elite status or access to their networks, no power 
except that of ourselves and those like us who believe in, 
hope and organise for, a better world, the message comes 
through that grains of sand do matter, and that small 
battalions can roll back the big battalions.22 
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